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migration and free trade. Migration has become a major  externalities.
concern in some OECD countries. But is migration really  Schiff identifies four types of externalities associated
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be optimal as well? Why do so many countries advocate  migration policies under alternative assumptions about
free trade but restrictions on international migration?  internalizing these externalities and concludes that the
Wellisch and Walz (1998) have shown that there is no  South always gains by freeing trade and the North  by
inconsistency in advocating free trade at the same time as  controlling immigration.
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ABSTRACT
Despite the predictions of standard trade theory, countries in the North are not indifferent between
free migration and free trade.  Explanations include the redistributive policies of the welfare state (Wellisch
and Walz, 1998, this Review).  This paper offers an explanation  using the concept of social  capital and extends
the analysis to the South.  The movement of people differs from the movement of goods and services because
people create attachments  with those with whom they share social capital, including  norms, language,  customs,
values and culture.  South-North migration affects social capital in both places.  Four types of externalities
associated with migration are identified. The paper examines  the impact of trade and migration  policies under
alternative assumptions about internalization  of these externalities, and concludes that the South always gains
by freeing trade and the North by controlling immigration.
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1.  Introduction
Migration has become a major issue of concern in a number of OECD countries.  In various EU
member countries, including France and Austria, parties advocating strong restrictions on immigration have
made important gains in recent years.  The same phenomenon is found in Australia. In California, voters
recently endorsed Proposition 187  which would  deny non-emergency  public services to illegal  imnmigrants,  and
the U.S.  Congress has considered legislation which would significantly reduce legal immigration.'  And
Canada has put in place programs designed  to ensure that immigrants  bring sufficient  human, financial  and/or
entrepreneurial capital with them (Stalker 1994).
In addition  to immigration  policy, destination  countries have considered  using trade policy to deal with
migration.  For instance, during the debate on NAFTA, Presidents Salinas and Bush argued that NAFTA
would help Mexico export more goods and fewer people, thereby reducing the migration 'threat'.  Similarly,
in the context of the concem with massive emigration  from the East, then-Germany's Foreign Minister Kinkel
declared that opening West European markets should be a priority in a new initiative on a common European
'ostpolitik' (Financial Times, March 24, 1994).2
But is migration really a 'threat'?  In other words, if free trade is optimal, should free migration not
be optimal as well?  A number of politicians and economists have addressed this issue and have taken the
'The issue of the net costs  and benefits  of inmnigration  to the U.S. has been  examnined  in a number  of studies  (e.g.,
Borjas,  Freeman  and Katz 1992;  Borjas  1993,  1995b).
2These statements  are based on the assumption  that trade liberalization  reduces migration,  i.e., that trade and
migration  are substitutes. Substitution  obtains  in the Heckscher-Ohlin  model, while complementarity  is obtained  by
Markusen  (1983)  in the case of economies  of scale  and sector-specific  technological  difference. Schiff  (1995)  obtains
complementarity  in the Heckscher-Ohlin  model  with  migration  costs and financing  constraints,  while substitution  is
obtained  for skilled  labor  and complementarity  for  unskilled  labor  in Lopez  and  Schiff  (1998). Faini  and  Venturini  (1993)
find  complementarity  between  income  and migration  from Southern  to Northern  Europe  at low levels  of income  and
substitution  at higher  levels. The 'Ricardian'  Heckscher-Ohlin  model  developed  in  this paper  implies  substitution  between
trade and  migration.seemingly inconsistent position of advocating free trade while also advocating restrictions on international
migration.  Bhagwati (1991) argues that this inconsistency  is  "  ...  due to the lack of consistent criteria by
which the two issues are judged and decided" (p. 3), and that applying the utilitarian logic to the problem of
migration leads to the free migration solution  (pp. 5,6).  Wellisch and Walz (1998, this Review) have shown
that there is no inconsistency  in advocating free trade as well as restrictions on migration under redistributive
policies in the rich countries.  This paper shows that this holds in the presence of social capital as well.
The concept of social capital was first introduced  by Coleman (1987, 1988, 1990). Social capital can
be defined as "...  the set of elements of the social structure that affect relations among people and are inputs
or arguments of the utility and/or production function" (Schiff, 1992a). These elements include social norms,
attitudes, values, language and culture. Social capital in the form of close ties to family and community may
generate benefits by raising utility and by raising output (by reducing the cost of transacting business due to
higher trust and enforceability of sanctions).
Several papers have examined the impact of some aspects of social capital on the accumulation of
human capital.  Coleman (1988) studied the impact of family structure.  Borjas (1992) showed that ethnicity
acts as an externality which slows the convergence of human capital across ethnic groups over time.  He
further shows  that ethnic capital is closely linked to ethnic neighborhoods  (Borjas, 1995a). He concludes that
further issues to be examined Include  the effects of interactions among ethnic groups.  One such interaction
which is examined here is that resulting from international  migration.
Evidence on the impact of social capital on migration is limited.  Cashin and Sahay (1996) examine
the determinants of migration across Indian states.  They find that income in the destination state has a much
smaller impact on inter-state migration in the period 1961-1991  than found in studies  of migration across U.S.
states in 1900-1987  or across prefectures in Japan in 1955-1985. The impact of income in the destination state
on migration in India is closer to that for migration  across regions of Europe.  The authors argue that the most
important factors explaining  the difference  in response in the U.S. and Japan on the one hand, and Europe and
2India on the other, are the higher level of social, cultural and linguistic  barriers in the latter.  Similarly, Faini
and Venturini (1993) state that "...  cultural, social and linguistic  differences ... may at least partly account for
much lower labor mobility in Europe than in the U.S."  Thus, it seems safe to assume that these barriers -
which play a significant role in North-North (Europe) and South-South (India) migration - are likely to play
an important role in South-North migration as well.
Katz and Stark (1987) examine international  migration in the presence of informational  asymmetries.
They conclude that the impact of migration on social attitudes may be of great importance and should be
incorporated if the theory is to be of use for policy analysis. This is what this paper intends to do3 I examine
the consequences  of migration policy for migration, social capital, income and welfare of the various groups.
Trade policy, migration costs, remittances and illegal migration are also examined.
Trefler (1995) shows that the model which best explains trade flows is a modified Heckscher-Ohlin
model with neutral technological differences and Armington-type home bias in consumption.  Davis and
Weinstein (1997) compare the Heckscher-Ohlin model of comparative advantage with that of economic
geography in order to explain the structure of OECD manufacturing production, and find that the former
explain 90 percent, the latter only percent.  And if this is true for the OECD, it is likely to hold even more
strongly between the North and the South. 4 Hence, the basic framework used here is the Heckscher-Ohlin
3Recent  work  - some  of which  is surveyed  in Borjas  (1994)  - has improved  our understanding  of migration  behavior.
Stark (and  colleagues)  has made  seminal  contributions  in the field, some of which  are collected  in his 1991  volume.
These include the analysis of the impact on migration  of a desire to diversify family risk, of financial  market
imperfections,  and  of the relationship  between  migration  on the one  hand,  and  the demand  for children,  investment  in their
human  capital  and  the motive  to remit  on the other. Group  features  of migration  -which  are central  to our analysis  - are
also  examined  in that  volume,  including  relative  deprivation  where  utility  also  depends  on how  individual  income  relates
to the income  of others  in the individual's  reference  group. Group  effects  are also  present  in Galor  and Stark  (1990)  who
examine  the effect of differential  rights  and incentives  faced  by immigrant  groups  and  natives. Using  the same  model,
Schaeffer  (1995)  adds  differences  in degrees  of assimilation,  and  Djajic  and  Milbourne  (1988)  compare  migrants'  behavior
in the host country  with  their behavior  after they return  home. Group  features  of migration  in an endogenous  growth
framework  are present  in Barro and Sala-i-Martin  1992,  1995;  Borjas  1992, 1995a;  Galor and Stark 1994;  and Haque
and Kim 1995.
4Note  also  that in the case  of Canada,  Balistreri  (1997)  found  that  agents'  views  on the distributional  effects  of trade
liberalization  are consistent  with  the predictions  of the Heckscher-Ohlin  model.
3model, but with three  additional features: a higher level of technology in the North than in the South, 5
international migration,  and social capital.  This model abstracts from aspects of migration described in
footnote 3 and from economies of scale and imperfect competition. 6
The  analysis is  carried  out under  two behavioral assumptions: either the  emigrants maximize
individual utility with no concern for  the welfare of others, or migration is part of a collective welfare
maximization process in which all migration externalities for emigrants and non-emigrants of the South are
internalized. In reality, migrants internalize some externalities  (e.g., with respect to their family and friends)
but probably not all.  By examining the implications of the model under the two extreme assumptions of zero
and full internalization, we can verify which results are robust and focus on them.  Social capital can be
thought of as affecting utility directly and/or indirectly through its effect on production.  Following Becker
(1996) and Schiff (1992a), I assume that social capital enters the utility function. Bliss (1994) makes a similar
assumption.  He states that migration may generate externalities through its effect on the survival of local
cultures and life-styles.  Others (e.g.,  Coleman 1988, Putnam 1993) have modeled social capital on the
production side. 7 Making the latter assumption  complicates  the analysis but does not affect the main findings.
However, an important difference is that internalization  of the externalities associated with social capital is
less likely to occur in the case where social capital enters the production function (see Section 5).
sin the phraseology  of Dixit  and Norman  (1980,  p. 148),  a two-country  model  where one country  has a general
technological  advantage  and where each country's comparative  advantage  depends  on relative factor  endowments  is
referred  to as a 'Ricardian'  Heckscher-Ohlin  model.
6Analysis of trade policy  under imperfect  competition  can be found  in Helpman  (1984),  Markusen  and Venables
(1988),  Rodrik  (1988)  and Venables  (1985). Factor  mobility  under imperfect  competition  is examined  in Ruffin  (1984).
See also  papers  in the Symposium  on International  Factor  Mobility  in the May 1983  issue  of the JIE.
7Group  effects in Borjas (1992, 1995a), Galor and Stark (1994) and Haque and Kim (1995)  also arise on the
production  side.
4Migration policy has generally been considered  to be an issue for receiving countries, not for sending
countries. 8 The asymmetry in the treatment of emigration and immigration has its basis in international law.
Emigration is considered to be a basic human right established in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, while the right of immnigration  is not recognized  by international  law.  Consequently, migration policy
is only considered here from the receiving country's viewpoint.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The model is presented in Section 2.  Welfare
implications of free migration and of the total restriction of migration are derived in Section 3.  Section 4
analyzes the properties and effects of an optimal immigration policy by the receiving North, including the
effect of illegal immigration. Sections 3 and 4 also examine the effects of trade policy and of a reduction in
migration costs.  Section 5 presents concluding  comments and suggestions  for future research. The results are
summarized in Table 1.
2.  The Model
Assume two small open economies, North (N) and South (S), producing two goods i (i =  1,2), and
whose terms of trade are determined on the world market.  The goods are produced with two factors, labor
(L) and capital (K), under a concave constant-returns-to-scale  technology.  The North and the world are
technologically more advanced than the South.  The technological advantage is assumed to be Hicks-neutral
and the same in both sectors.  Output Q, of good i is
Qi=  fj(Kis,  Lis);  i =  1, 2; s = South,
(1)  Qin  =  Xf(Kin,  Lin), X >  1;  i  =  1, 2; n  North,  and
afj(K:, L))/OL)J  ->  (-  0) as LJ/K  - 0 (->  oo);  j = s,n [Inada conditions].
The South (North) is abundant  in labor (capital)  relative to the world.  Thus, the North has an absolute
8 Exceptions  include  Bhagwati  (1972, 1976)  where  an ermigration  tax by the South  is proposed  in the context  of the
brain  drain  problem, Djajic  and Milbourne  (1988),  and Baldwin  and Venables  (1994).
5advantage  in the production of both goods relative to the South and a comparative advantage  in the production
of the capital-intensive  good 1, while the South has a comparative advantage in the production of the labor-
intensive good 2.  Both labor and capital are mobile intersectorally but only labor is mobile internationally.
Under free trade, the prices of goods 1 and 2 and the wages W,, and W, in the North and,  South are given by
(2)  Pin  = Pis =  Pi' (i =  1, 2),  Wn =  W  =  kW, >  Ws,
where the asterisk indicates world prices.  Thus, factor price equalization  holds under free trade per
unit of effective labor.
Migration is concentrated while trade is not.  That is, the North and the South trade in the world
market but migration only takes place between the two of them.  For instance, Mexico (Morocco) (Turkey)
trades with the entire world but its citizens emigrate essentially to the U.S. (France) (Germany).9 I examine
the impact of policies on migrants and on both labor and capital in the North and South.
Assume that all individuals  have the same indirect utility function U, which is given by
(3')  Uj = U(Yj, Plj, P2j; SK);  j =  s, m (migrants), n,
with U increasing in income Y and in social  capital SK and decreasing in PI and P2, and with negative
second derivatives.  Assume for simplicity that U is separable and can be written as
(3)  Ui = X(Yj, P 1j, P 2j) + Z(SKj); j = s, m, n,
where X is the component of welfare which is considered in the national accounts. 10
How does migration affect the level of social capital in the various groups?  I assume that most people
have a positive preference  for associating with those who share the same customs, values, language and
culture.  This is supported by evidence from the U.S. and the EU that most immigrants are not distribEted
9The assumptions,  that migration  only  takes  place  between  the South  and North, and that the South  and North are
small  (so that their terms of trade are given  exogenously),  allow  us to abstract  from  the other  countries. Extending  the
analysis  to more countries  is discussed  in Section  5.
10 Note that  policies  which  raise  X need not  raise welfare. For instance,  Schiff  (1992a)  has shown  that a policy  or
technological  change  resulting  in an  increase  in labor  mobility  and  income  may  be  immiserizing  due  to externalities
associated with social capital.
6randomly across the receiving country.  Rather, immigrants from a given country tend to cluster in specific
cities and neighborhoods in order to benefit from the common social capital.  For instance, in the U.S.,
immigrant  neighborhoods  include Little Havana in Miami, Chinatown in San Francisco, Greektown  in Chicago
and Little Italy in New York. On the effect of immigrant clustering on the speed of assimilation and on the
welfare of the native population, see Lazear (1995a,b).
Assume that in the sending country S,  social capital SKs decreases with the level of migration M
because it reduces the size of the group of people of similar background and values with whom each member
of the group  can interact.  As people migrate,  those left behind (family, friends,  community, village)
experience a loss in social capital (Bliss, p. 76). Emigration results in a 'social capital drain'.  The marginal
loss in social capital is assumed to increase with the level of migration.
In the receiving country N,  social capital SK" depends negatively on the migration level.  The
assumption is that the local population and the immigrants  differ significantly  in language, customs, values and
culture, so that an increase in migration lowers the North's social capital. The marginal loss in social capital
is assumed to increase with the level of migration.  Our results are not affected if migration has a positive
impact on the North's  social capital SK,,  at low levels of migration."  12
For the migrants to the North, migration results in a loss of social capital (SKm  <  SKS). Moreover,
social capital SKm  depends positively on both M and SK  n and is strictly concave in both variables.  Thus,
migration has two opposite effects on SKm. First, SKn increases directly with migration because the migrants
The negative  migration  externalities  for the non-migrants  in the South  and for the natives  in the North  are also
discussed  in Layard  et al. (1992). Note also  that  the assumption  of a negative  impact  of mnigration  on the North's social
capital need not imply a prejudiced attitude towards  imiigrants.  For instance, if immigrants  and local residents are alike
in all respects except in the language they speak, communication  among local residents  may become increasingly  difficult
as the share of immigrants rises.
12 I have assumed that the North's social capital is affected by migration, for instance as described in footnote 11.
One could also model the interaction between the natives of the North and rnigrants by assuming that the North's
social capital only depends on interaction among the North's natives, and that at the same time natives become less
hospitable to migrants as their number increases.  As long as the lack of hospitality affects the migrants' welfare, the
results are unaffected.
7benefit from the interaction with a larger number of people from their own group.  Second, as migration
increases, SKn  falls, natives of the North become less hospitable, and that leads to a reduction in SKm.
Even though it rises at first, the migrants' social capital SKm  eventually falls with migration because
the positive effect decreases while the negative effect increases with  migration.  At that point, under individual
utility maximization, migrants who have settled in the North would be expected to resist further immigration
since it will lower their utility.  In fact, the 1993 Latino National Political Survey found that 65 percent of
Hispanics living in the U.S. want limits imposed on further Hispanic immigration (Chavez 1993, Fukuyama
1993). 13
The relationship between social capital and migration described above is given by:
SK& =  SK&(M), SK 1,'  <  0, SKn"  <  0,
(4)  SK,  =  SK&(M),  SKS' <  0, SKS" <  0,
SKm  =  SKm(M,  SKJ), DSKm/aM  >  0, aSKm/aSK 1 >  0,
a28SKm/8M 2 <  0,  62SKM/OSK 2 <  0,
and SKm <  SK, for all M.
3.  Free Migration
In this section, restrictions on migration -- such as immigration taxes or quotas  -- are absent.  Assume
that migration is costly, with migration cost equal to C.  Observed cases of economic migration entail an
internal equilibrium where some but not all the population migrates.  Hence, assume 0 <  M  <  Ls, where L,
is the initial (pre-migration) population of the South.  Corner solutions are discussed following equation (7).
3.1. Individual Utility Maximization
13 Note that these assumptions do not apply to a situation of low population density in the North where there is a
8Assume  that migrants  maximize  their individual  utility Ur.  hi that case, remittances  R =  0.
Migration  takes  place if Urn  > U, at M = 0.  Assuming  an internal  solution  (a necessary  condition  is given
in the context  of equation  (7) below),  equilibrium  is given  by the migration  arbitrage  condition
(5)  Urn =  Us
with Um =  Xm(Wn  - C, Pln, P2,,)  + Z,n[SKrn(M,  SKn(M))],
and  U.  =  X,(Ws,  PI,, P2s)  + Z,[SK,(M)].
The equilibrium  characterized  by equation  (5) is not an optimum  for the migrants, for the non-
emigrants  in the South  or for the North. This is due to the four types of externalities  - described  in Section
2 - associated  with the  effect  of migration  on social  capital. From  equations  (3)-(5),  all groups  lose  under  free
migration  compared  to the no migration  situation.  Those  remaining  in the South  lose  because  migrat
9SPd=  Pd +  EX,
(6)  Pd =  (Ur - Us)/(OXm/DY,
EX =  [M.dU /dM]/(aX /lYp)  +  [(L, - M).dU,/dM]/(aX,/aY,)
=  [M.Zm'.SK.']/(aXm/aYm)  +  [(La  - M).Z,'.SKs]/(aX,/CY,)
where SKm  '=-SK_/aM  + (OSKm/aSKn).SKn'.
The second term of EX is negative while the first term might be positive at first but must be negative
at the equilibrium (as shown below in the context of equation (7)).  Hence, EX might be positive for small
values of M, but it must be negative at equilibrium. Consequently, SPd  has been drawn in Figure 1 under the
assumption that EX  <  0 for all values of M,  i.e.,  SPd <  Pd for all M.  The upward-sloping curve MC
represents the negative externality of migration for the North.
In the absence of an immnigration  policy by the North, the free migration equilibrium is at point C
where Pd  = 0 or Um = U,  The social optimum for the South is at the lower migration level shown by point
B where SPd =  0, with a net social gain from migration equal to triangle ABO.  The net welfare effect of
migration for the South is (triangle ABO - triangle BCF) <  0  (since U, and Urn  U, fall with migration).
The loss to the North is the area under the MC curve between points 0  and C.
In the presence of social capital, Bhagwati's argument (1991) on the optimality of free migration does
not hold.  Equilibrium  in the absence of internalization  of migration  externalities  is at point C, but the optimum
for the South is at point B, the optimum for the North is at point 0  (no migration), and the global optimum
is at point G where SPd =  MC. 14
To examine the impact on migration and welfare of a reduction in migration costs and of imposing
14. A simnilar  result is obtained  by Francois  (1994)  who shows  that  migration  can reduce  global  welfare  in a model
with  Ethier-type  trade in internediates  and spillover  effects  associated  with  international  scale  economies.  Baldwin
and Venables  (1994),  who  examnine  the transition  in Central  and Eastern  Europe  (CEE),  show  that free  migration
(emigration  restrictions)  may  result in low (igh) levels  of capital,  skilled  labor  and per capita income  in the long  run.
They  do not examine  the effect  of emigration  restrictions  on the  joint income  of emigrants  and non-emigrants  of the
CEE  or on the income  of natives  in the West.
10a tariff,  equation (5) is differentiated totally to obtain
(7)  dM =  {(OXm/OY.).d(Wn  - C)  + (aXr/OPin).dPjn  + (8Xrn/aP 2n).dP 2n  -
[(0X,/aY.).dW,  +  (aX,/IP, 1 ) .dPj, +  (8X,IaP2 ) .dP2,I}/A,
where A-  Z'  .SKs' - Z'  .SKm'.
That A  >  0 is a necessary condition for an internal migration solution is shown as follows.  Um >
Us at M = 0 if migration takes place.  As migration increases, U, falls.  For an internal equilibrium, Urn  must
be equal to Us.  Thus, Ur must fall faster than Us.  And since factor prices are not affected by migration (as
long as there is no specialization), it follows that the fall in Um  due to the fall in SKm  must be larger than the
fall in U, due to the fall in SK,.  This is identical to the condition that A  >  0.  15
What about corner  solutions? As noted above,  A  >  0  is a  necessary condition for  an internal
equilibrium with diversified output.  However, even if A < 0, an internal migration solution  obtains because
migration results in specialization.  Assume  A < 0.  Then, at existing wages, migration does not lead to
equalization  of U, and U,,.  As migration proceeds, output of good 2 (the labor-intensive exportable) falls and
output of good 1 (the capital-intensive  importable) increases, with a decrease in trade.  When the capital-labor
ratio in the South equals that in the world, trade stops.  With further migration, the South becomes abundant
in capital, exporting good 1 and importing good 2.  At some point, endowments  are no longer  in the cone of
diversification  and the South stops producing good 2.  As migration proceeds, wages in the South rise.  Given
that labor's marginal productivity tends to infinity as the labor-capital ratio tends to zero (see equation (1)),
U, reaches equality with U,, before the entire labor force of the South has emigrated.  In that case, U, (=U, 1
may be higher or lower under free migration than in the absence of migration.  In what follows, I assume
output in the South remains diversified, and A >  0.
'5Assume  A > 0 at the lowest-migration  equilibrium,  with M =  Mo.  dA/dM =  [Z  '. SK  "  + Z s  "'.  (SK ,)2]  -
[Zm' SKm" +Z.  .(SK 1,')2] Ž 0 for M > Mo  is a sufficient  condition  for uniqueness.  dA/dM2O  for M  > Mo  means  that
A remains positive as M increases.  In other words,  the slope of U,, remains larger (in absolute value) than the slope of
Us, and the equilibrium is unique.  If dA/dM  < 0 for M > Mo , there may be one or more equilibria.
11What is the effect of a fall in migration costs?  From equation (7),
(8)  dM/dC  =  - (6X,mOYj/)IA  <  0.
A fall in migration  costs results in immiserization  for all groups (except capital whose income remains
unchanged). Migration increases and SK, and U, fall.  Since in equilibrium, Um  =  Us, Ur falls as well.  And
Un falls since SK,'  <  0.  Note that if the increase in migration  is large enough, the South could become capital
abundant in the new equilibrium and export the capital-intensive  good.
What about the impact of imposing a tariff T on the imports of good I in the South? Then, PI, =  P,
+ T.  From equation (7), we have
(9)  dM/dT =  - [(aX,IDYj).(OW,I8T)  + OX,/cP 1 I]/A  >  0
since aW,/IT  and OX,iaPI,  are negative.  Thus, imposing a tariff in the South leads to an increase in
migration.  U, falls because of labor's real income loss and because SK, falls.  U,n = U, falls as well, and U,
falls since SKI'  <  0.  Capital's real income rises in the South (magnification  effect) and remains unchanged
in the North.  The South as a whole loses because of the trade distortion and the loss in social capital.  The
North loses because of the loss of social capital.
A similar result obtains if the North imposes a tariff on its labor-intensive  imports.  The real wage in
the North rises, resulting in an increase in migration; thus, Us falls (as social capital falls) and so does Un  =
Us.  The effect on labor in the North is ambiguous because the real wage rises while social capital falls.
Capital's real income in the North falls.  The North as a whole loses because of the trade distortion and the
loss of social capital.  The South loses as real factor income is unchanged but social capital falls.  The
above results are given in Table 1 and can be suInmarized by
Proposition 1.  Under individual  utility maximization
1) all labor groups (natives of the North and South and migrants) are worse off under free migration than with
total restriction on migration, and capital is not affected;
2) natives in the North and South and migrants, and the North and South as a whole, lose from imposing a
12tariff in the South, while capital's income rises in the South and is uncha+ed  in the North; migrants and
natives in the South, as well as capital in the North, and the North and South as a whole, lose from a tariff in
the North, while capital in the South is unaffected and the impact on labor in the North is ambiguous;
3) all labor groups lose from a decrease in migration costs, and capital's real income is unchanged.
3.2. Collective  Welfare  Maximization
Several studies indicate that migration is a collective rather than an individual decision (e.g.,  Stark
1991). The decision-making group may be the household, the extended family or the community.  Assume
that the group maximizing welfare is the South's population  or labor force. 16  Then, the effect of emigration
on the social capital of the South's non-emigrants (SKs)  and emigrants (SKin)  is completely internalized. 1 7
Defining the welfare of labor in the South NW, as the sum of the utilities of the emigrants and non-
emigrants of the South, the problem is to determine the levels of migration M and of remittances per migrant
R which maximize
(10)  NW,  =  Vs +  Vm =  (L,-M).U,  +  M.Um
=  (L5-M).{X,(W,+R.M/(L3-M), Pjs, P2) + ZjSSK 5(M)]}
+ M. {Xm(WIfC-R,  P 1, 1, P 2D)  +  Zm[SKm(M,SKn(M))]},
where V, (Vr)  is the welfare of the non-emigrants (emigrants) of the South, and remittances are
evenly distributed among the non-emigrants, each of whom gets R. M/(L 5-M).  Setting aNW,/OR = 0, we have
(11)  aX5/aY,  =  aXmlaYm.
Hence, in order to maximize NW,, emigrants remit to the point where the marginal utilities  of income
16 I assume  that  as a fixed  factor, capital  is not involved  in the migration  decision,  that  it does not support  migration
and  receives  no remittances  from  migrants.
t7Experimental  evidence  on internalization  of other  people's  welfare  is provided  in Andreoni  (1995)  and Andreoni
and Miller  (1993). These  studies  find  that  partial  cooperation  takes  place  in public-goods  experiments  among  strangers
even  though  free riding is the dominant  strategy. Chirinko  (1990)  provides  a theoretical  analysis  of the role of social
capital  in the private  provision  of public  goods.
13for the migrants living in the North and for the non-emigrants in the South are equalized.  Given that prices
are the same in the North and South under free trade, equation (11) implies Y, = Ymn.  Setting ONW,  /8M
O  and making use of equations (10), (11), and of Y, = Ym,  we have
(12)  R =  [(Ls - M)/LJ .(Wn - C - Ws) >  0,
Wn - C - W,  =  (U, - U,j)/(aX,/aYj)  - EX,
where EX is defined in equation (6).
Equation  (12) says that remittances  are such as to equate Y, and Ym,  and migration is such as to equate
the income gain from migration (W,j  - C - W,) to the sum of the loss of individual  utility from migration (U,
- Um)I(8Xs/OYs)  and the loss (-EX) due to the fall in the social capital of the South's emigrants and non-
emigrants.
The South's welfare labor NW, is higher in this case than in the absence of migration or in the case
of free migration under individual  utility maximization  since all externalities affecting NW, are internalized.
There are two opposite effects on migration compared to the case of individual  utility maximization (point C
in Figure 1).  First, migration falls with internalization  of the effects on SK, and SKin  (point B in Figure  1).
Second, recall that the social gain of migration for the South SPd  was obtained for R =  0.  However, now
that remittances are given by equation (12), the social gain from migration at point B is positive.  Hence, the
optimal migration level is to the right of point B.  Whether welfare in the North is higher or lower depends
on whether the optimal migration level is smaller or larger, respectively, than the one under individual  utility
maximization  (point C).  Thus, Bhagwati'  s point on the optimality  of free migration  holds for the South in this
case, though not for the North or the North and South taken as a whole (capital's income is not affected).
What occurs with a fall in migration costs?  Since all migration externalities are internalized by the
South, NW, increases when C falls.  The effect on migration and remittances can be derived from equation
(12).  At the initial values of M and R, aNW,/8M >  0 (since Yi is higher) and aNW,/OR >  0 (since Y,  >
Y, and aXm/YIY,  <  aX,/8Y,).  Thus,  both migration and remittances increase.  Given the  increase  in
14migration, Un falls.  Capital income is not affected.
If the South imposes an import tariff, capital gains, the wage rate W, falls, migration increases and
U n  falls. Since the marginal utility of income for non-emigrants rises above that of emigrants, the level of
remittances R increases as well (equation (12)).  The South internalizes all the migration externalities but its
labor welfare NW, falls because of the trade distortion.  The North's real income is not affected but it loses
because of the loss in social capital.
If the North imposes a tariff on its labor-intensive imnports,  capital in the North loses, Wn rises,
migration and remittances increase, the North loses (from the trade distortion and the loss in social capital)
and the South gains.  The South gains at the initial level of migration and remittances because migrants now
obtain a higher wage in the North, and it gains by adjusting the levels of migration and remittances optimally.
Though the North as a whole loses, the impact on labor in the North is ambiguous: it gains from the higher
wage and loses from the decline in social capital.
The above results are presented in Table 1 and can be summarized by
Proposition 2. Under collective welfare (NWs)  maximization  in the South,
1) NW, is higher and welfare for  natives of the North Un,  is lower  under free migration than with total
restriction on migration, while capital is unaffected;
2) NW, is higher than under individual utility maximization, but the effect on U,, is ambiguous;
3) a tariff by the South lowers NW, and U,,; capital in the South gains and that in the North is unaffected;
4) NW, increases and U,, falls with a fall in migration costs or with a tariff by the North; and though  the North
as a whole loses from the tariff, the impact on the North's  labor is ambiguous.
4. Optimal  Immigration  Restriction
Following the 1973 oil shock  and the subsequent  recession  and rise in unemployment  in Europe, policy
changed from one of encouraging immigration to what Zimmerman (1995) has called a "'Fortress  Europe'
15immigration policy".  He describes many Europeans as feeling that they belong to a club and that immigrants
should pay an entry fee for access to the club and its valuable resources (i.e.,  high wages).  He argues that
such an instrument could be used to control immigration flows.  Similarly, Becker (1987) has proposed
auctioning U.S.  immigrant visas.  And immigration quotas  have been reduced by 20% in the last two years
in Australia and further cuts are being considered.  Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983) have also examined the
effect of immigration quotas and taxes.  The impact of such a policy is examined in this section.
Assume that the North sets an immigration tax Tn (or,  equivalently, that it sets a quota which is
auctioned to the immigrants).  There are many ways to collect the tax, including fees to obtain immigration
papers and payment of lower wages in a segmented labor market.  Authorities in the North choose T 11 to
maximize the North's  welfare,  V,,, subject to a constraint.  If migrants maximize individual utility,  the
constraint is the migration arbitrage condition  Urn  = U, with R = 0.  If migration is part of a collective  welfare
maximization process,  the constraint is the maximization of welfare  NW, by  the South.  Assume that
immigration tax revenues T 1.M are distributed uniformly among the L,, local residents in the North.  Then,
per capita tax revenue is T,,.M/L,,. Since L,,  is given, maximizing  V, = L 1 .U,,  is equivalent  to maximizing  U,,.
4.1. Individual Utility  Maximization
U. is given by
(13)  Un = X(W1, +  T,,.M/L,, PIn, P 20) +  Zn1SKn(M)].
The problem for the North is to select an immigration tax T, in order to maximize Un subject to Um
=  U, and  R  =  0.  Then,  U,,, [equation  (5)] becomes
(14)  U,, =  X,n(Wn - C - Tn, PIn, P 2n)  +  Z  [SK,n(M,  SKJ(M))],
and dM [equation (7)] becomes
(15)  dM  =  {(OX,,,/aYr).d(W,,  - Tn-  C)  +  (aXr/aPin).dPIn  +  (aX,,,/P 2,).dP2n
16- [(8X,/6Y,).dW, +  (Ml/ap1h).dPI, +  (8XMIaP 2,).dP2}IA,
with A defined in equation (7).
Maximizing U, with respect to Tn subject to equation (15), we obtain
(16)  Tn,  = A.M/(aXm/aY,n)  - Zn'.SK 11'.Lnl/(Xn/aYn) >  0.
The North as a whole is better off in the optimal immigration tax case than in the case of free
migration (Tn = 0) and of no migration (M = 0) because it disposes of an additional instrument to maximize
its welfare V,.  How does welfare in the South U , =  U m  compare under these three alternative scenarios?
Factor prices (and capital and labor's real income) in the South are unaffected by the immigration tax Tn.
Thus,  the effect on U, (and on  U,, =  Us) depends entirely on the impact on SK.  From  equation (15),
migration falls - and hence SK, increases - with an increase in Tn  Thus, the South's welfare is lowest under
free migration, it is higher in the case of an optimal immigration tax, and it is highest under total restriction
on migration.
An imrnmigration  tax reduces migration and thus reduces the externalities  migration causes.  This raises
the South's pre-tax welfare for migrants and non-migrants. A more unusual result is that the welfare increase
associated with the higher level of social capital dominates the income loss due to the tax, so that after-tax
welfare rises as well. 18
The results are illustrated in Figure 1.  Maximum welfare for the North under an immigration tax is
obtained where MC =  MR.  Then, equilibrium is at point E, migration equals OH, and Tn =  EH.  Welfare
for the South is higher than in the absence of the tax because U, (=  UJ, is higher at the lower migration level
(point H).  The welfare increase for the South under the tax is equal to triangle CFB minus triangle HBJ minus
the tax payments OHETn. Welfare for the South is lower under the tax than in the absence of migration (the
gain AJHO is smaller than the tax payment  OHETn). The gain from migration for the North is the tax revenue
'8A similar  result is found  for congested  common  property  resources  when  congestion  reaches  a critical  level  (Schiff,
1992b).
17T,.M  or area OHETn  minus the area under the MC curve between 0 and H.  This gain is larger than the gain
(equal to zero) in the absence of migration and larger than the gain under free migration (a loss equal to the
area under the MC curve between points 0  and C).
A tariff in the South results in a decrease in U,  The wage rate in the South, W, ,. falls and migration
increases (equation  (15)).  Labor loses because of the lower wage and the lower level of social capital. Capital
gains but the South as a whole loses due to the trade distortion and loss in social capital. Since U, = Urn,  Urn
falls as well.  On the other hand, Un increases because of the increase in the South's migration demand.
A fall in the migration cost C results in an increase in migration  (equation (15)), SK, falls, and U, and
Urn = Us fall.  The North gains because of the increased migration  demand.  Note also that migrants and non-
migrants in the South lose from a tariff in the North, while the impact on the North as a whole is ambiguous
(it loses from the trade distortion but gains from the increase in the South's migration demand).  On the other
hand, labor in the North gains both from the higher wage and from the increase in the South's migration
demand.
Note that under free migration, any change in policy or costs in the South  which results in an increase
in migration  demand implies a loss to the North.  Under the optimal immigration  tax, the opposite  is true.  Any
increase in migration demand due to a change in the South results in a gain for the North.  In this case, the
North holds monopoly power over a scarce resource, namely access to the North's high-wage labor market.
The larger the demand for the monopolist's resource, the better off it is.
Illegal Migration
Assume that a fraction J <  1 of migrants  pays the immigration  tax, while a fraction 1-,B  does not, and
--for simplicity--that migrants only decide whether to migrate legally or not upon arrival to the North. The
effective migration demand from which the North can extract an immigration tax is lower in this case than in
the absence of illegal migration, the optimal immigration tax T,, is lower as well, and the number of migrants
18is larger. Those remaining in the South lose because social capital SK, is lower, and on average migrants lose
as well since Un = U 5,  where Urn  is an average of the utility of legal (UL)  and illegal (U1L)  migrants.  Legal
migrants' utility UL  is lower than Urn,  and since Ur falls, so does UL.  Illegal migrants' utility UIL is higher
than Un but the impact on UIL is ambiguous since illegal migrants gain from evading the immigration tax but
lose from a lower level of social capital SKrn  associated with the larger number of migrants.  The North loses
because its revenue from the immigration tax is lower and because social capital SKn  is lower.
The above results are given in Table 1 and can be summarized by
Proposition 3. With individual utility maximization  and an optimal immigration tax,
1) the North is better off than with free migration (Tn =  0) or with no migration (M =  0);
2) the Southern emigrants and non-emigrants  are better off than under free migration  but worse off than under
total restriction on migration;
3) a tariff in the South or a decrease in migration costs lowers welfare for migrants and non-migrants in the
South and raises welfare in the North (while capital in the South loses with a tariff); a tariff in the North
lowers welfare for migrants and non-migrants in the South, and while labor in the North gains, the effect
on the North as a whole is ambiguous; and
4) all labor groups lose under illegal immigration, except for the illegal imrnigrants for whom the welfare
impact is ambiguous.
4.2. Collective Welfare Maximization
In this case, the North maximizes Ur, [see equation (13)] subject to the South maximizing NW,.  NW,
defined in equation (10) now becomes:
(17)  NW,  =  (L,-M).{X,[W,  +  R.M/(L,-M),  PI,, P2J  +  Z,[SK,(M)]}
+  M.{X(Wn-C-Tn-R,  Plm,  P2,)  +  Zrn[SKr(M,  SKn,(M)I}.
19I assume that the South maximnizes  NW, taking T 11as exogenously  determined. 1 9 Its control variables
are the level of migration and of remittances. As in the case of free migration,  the optimal level of remittances
is such as to equate the marginal utility of income of emigrants and non-emigrants  (equation (11)).  The results
are shown in Figure 1.  Assume for illustrative  purposes that the curve SPd  represents the.  South's gains from
- and  its maximum  willingness  to pay for - migration  under  collective welfare  maximization.  Given  SPd, the
North's optimum is where MC =  MR'.  Equilibrium is at point E', migration is OH' and the optimal tax Tn'
=  E'H'.  The South is worse off with the tax than under free migration,  with welfare in the South falling from
ABO to AE'TI'.  The welfare gain for the North is Tn'E'H'O  minus the area under the MC curve between
points 0  and H'.  The equilibrium at E' does not maximize global welfare.  That is obtained at point G which
is reached if the North imposes a tax Tg. Then, MC =  SPd  and all migration externalities are internalized.
However, as the North is concerned with its own welfare rather than with global welfare,  it exploits its
monopoly power by levying a tax TI'  >  Tg (or by auctioning a quota equal to OH'  <  OL).
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983) find that an immigration tax raises welfare in the North and lowers
it in the South as well as globally.  Our results under internalization of migration externalities are close to
theirs in this case, though not the effect on global welfare.  The impact on global welfare is positive for a tax
up to Tg but is ambiguous for a higher tax such as T,,.
Note that in the optimal migration tax case, as in the case of free migration, the effect on migration
of switching  from individual  utility maximization  to collective  welfare maximization  is ambiguous.  Migration
falls with the internalization  of the migration  externalities,  but it increases with the switch  from zero to positive
remittances. NW, is higher under collective  welfare maximization  since all externalities  are internalized  while
the effect on the North's welfare is ambiguous (given the ambiguous effect on migration demand).
19  The South might want to use the level of migration as a strategic variable since a reduction in migration
implies a lower immigration tax.  As mentioned earlier, I assume that the South does not restrict migration.
These strategic issues will be examined in future work (see Section 5).
20A fall in migration costs generates an increase in NW,.  The South gains from the lower migration
cost for  given levels of migration and remittances, and it gains by changing the level of migration and
remittances optimally. The North gains as well since  demand for migration increases  with the fall in migration
costs.  A tariff by the South  results in a gain for capital in the South, a decrease in Ws, more migration, higher
remittances, a loss for the South, a higher immigration tax and a gain for the North.  A tariff by the North
results in a gain for the South  and has an ambiguous  impact on the North as a whole, though  labor in the North
gains (and capital loses).  The North loses and the South gains under illegal migration.
The above results are presented in Table 1 and can be summarized by
Proposition 4 Under collective welfare maximization  by the South and an optimal immigration tax,
1) the South's national welfare is higher than under individual utility maximization while the effect on the
North's  welfare is ambiguous;
2) both the South and the North gain from a decrease in migration costs;
3) the South loses and the North gains from a tariff in the South; the South gains from a tariff in the North,
and while labor in the North gains, the effect on the North as a whole is ambiguous; and
4) the North loses and the South gains in the case of illegal migration.
5. Concluding Comments
The movement of people differs from the movement of goods and services because people create
attachments. They tend to feel closer to those with whom they share social capital - including  customs, values,
language, history and culture - and they interact with them at lower cost.  Consequently, migration generates
externalities.
Two results hold irrespective of the degree of internalization  of the migration externalities: the South
gains from liberalizing its trade,  and the North  gains from  imposing an immigration tax.  The policy
implications are clear: the South should liberalize trade while the North should impose an immigration tax.
21The latter has been proposed by Zimmerman (1995) for the EU.  Becker (1987) has proposed a similar
solution for the U.S.  Note that our analysis does not suggest that immigration should be banned, which is
clearly sub-optimal, but rather argues for some form of control on migration.
Note also that these policy recommendations improve the distribution of income in the North and
South by improving the welfare of labor relative to that of capital.  Trade liberalization in the South results
in higher wages (and social capital) and lower returns to capital.  An immigration tax in the North has no
impact on capital but labor gains from collecting the tax (and from higher social capital).
As found by Wellisch and Walz (1998, this Review), though free trade is optimal for the North under
free migration, free migration is not optimal  under free trade.  The optimum is to control migration.  If this
involves an immigration tax (or,  equivalently, auctioning immigration visas), then the optimum tariff  is
positive.  Otherwise, the optimum tariff is zero.
Note that the results obtained  here have been derived under special assumptions. We have ruled out
terms-of-trade and scale-related effects and effects of migration on real incomes (but see the discussion of
corner solutions in Section 3.1).  It is likely that a combination  of these effects might weaken the qualitative
results identified here.  Even so, this paper has argued that the concept of social capital reflects important
aspects of the real world, and has shown that incorporating it in the analysis can radically affect the standard
results on migration and trade.20
The analysis presented here can be extended  in several directions. First, one might consider dynamic
aspects, including  the possibility of return migration, of migrants acquiring  social capital of the Northern type
over time, and of a Northern policy of.temporary (rotating) migration.
Second, one might want to consider emigration policy as well as immigration policy.  For
instance, Bhagwati (1976) and Djajic and Milbourne (1988) examined the impact of emigration taxes, while
20 Social  capital  was modeled  as an argument  of the utility  function.  Similar  results  are obtained  if social  capital
is modeled  as an argument  of the production  function.  A major  difference  is that internalization  of migration  externalities
is less  likely  to occur in the latter  case. Then,  the South  also  gains under  the North's optimal  immigration  tax.
22Lucas (1987) examined emigration quotas in the context of emigration to South Africa.  In the case of both
emigration taxes in the South and immigration taxes in the North, optimal tax levels would be determined
strategically.
Third, emigration might originate in more than one sending country.  For instanc*e,  most immigrants
to the EU come from various North African and Sub-Sahara  African countries as well as from Eastern Europe
and the Near East.  Similarly, immigrants to the U.S.  and Canada originate in various Latin American,
Caribbean and Asian countries.  In that case, strategic interaction might also take place between the various
sending countries.21
21This  has been exaniined  for commodity  exports  in Panagariya  and Schiff  (1994).
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25Table 1. Welfare  Effect of Migration  and Trade Policies*
Individual Utility Maximization  Collective Welfare Maximization
I. Free Migration - LS,LN,M  are better off than with total  --LS  + M(LN)  are better (worse) off than
...  restriction on migration; KS  and KN  are  with total restriction on migration; KS
not affected; N and S lose.  and KN  unaffected; S(N) gains (loses).
Tariff in the South--Ls, LN  and M lose; KS  gains, KN is  --LS+M and LN lose; Ks gains; KN
unaffected; N and S lose.  unaffected; N and S lose.
Tariff in the North--Ls, M, KN, and N and S lose; KS  --LS+M gain; KS  unaffected;S gains;N
unaffected; effect on LN  ambiguous.  and KN lose; effect on LN  ambiguous;
Migration cost falls-Ls, LN  and M lose; KS  and KN  --KS,KNunaffected;  LS+M gain; LN
unaffected; N and S lose.  loses; S gains and N loses.
II. Migration Tax  --LN  is better off than with both free or no  --LN  is better off than,with both free or
migration; LS  and M are better (worse)  no migration; LS +  M are worse
off than with free (no) migration; KS  (better) off than with free (no) and
KN  are unaffected.  migration; KS and KN  are unaffected.
Tariff in the South-- LS  and M lose; LN  gains; KS  loses; KN is  --LS+M loses; LN  gains; KS  gains;
unaffected; S loses and N gains.  KN  unaffected; S loses and N gains.
Tariff in the North --LS  and M lose; LN  gains; KS  is unaffected;  --LS+  M and LN  gain; KS  is unaffected;
KN loses; S loses; effect on N ambiguous.  KN loses; S gains; effect on N is
ambiguous.
Migration cost falls--Ls and M lose; LN  gains; KS  and KN  are  -- LS+M  and LN  gain; capital is not
unaffected; S loses and N gains.  affected; S and N gain.
Illegal Migration----  All labor groups lose except for illegal  --S gains and N loses (capital is
migrants for whom the effect is ambiguous;  unaffected).
migrants as a whole lose; capital is
unaffected; S and N lose.
* LS  (LN)  are natives in the South (North); M are migrants; KS  (KN)  is capital in the South (North);
S (N) represents the South (North) as a whole.
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